Allow ABI-specific contract call parameters
For contract interactions, use Smart Contract Interfaces (ABI upload) rather than raw calldata slicing. ABI-based policies use named arguments (eth.tx.contract_call_args['arg_name']) instead of byte offsets — they’re more readable, less
error-prone, and won’t silently break if the contract encoding changes. Raw eth.tx.data[...]
slicing is a fallback for contracts where no ABI is available.
Restrict a transfer call to a maximum amount and a specific recipient:
Iterating over contract call arguments
When a contract function takes an array parameter, use.count(), .all(), and .any() to enforce conditions across every element,
rather than checking a single index.
Syntax:
- Array element count:
eth.tx.contract_call_args['arrayArg'].count() - All elements match:
eth.tx.contract_call_args['arrayArg'].all(item, <condition>) - Any element matches:
eth.tx.contract_call_args['arrayArg'].any(item, <condition>)
For functions that take a
tuple array (e.g. executeBatch((address,uint256,bytes)[] calls)), tuple fields are currently
accessed by position rather than name: call[0] (first field), call[1] (second field), and so on.
The positions correspond to the order of fields as defined in your ABI — substitute the correct indices for your own struct.
Named access such as call['target'] is not yet supported and produces OUTCOME_ERROR.address[] parameter — such as a disperse-style multi-send contract — use
in to restrict signing to a known set of addresses:
Allow ERC-20 transfers for a specific token smart contract (raw calldata fallback)
Use this pattern only when an ABI is unavailable. The selector0xa9059cbb is the 4-byte keccak256
hash of transfer(address,uint256).
Allow anyone to sign transactions for testnet (Sepolia)
Allow ETH transactions with a specific nonce range
Allow signing of EIP-712 payloads for Hyperliquid ApproveAgent operations
Inspect nested fields in EIP-712 message payloads
Theeth.eip_712.message map supports nested field access using bracket notation and array iteration operators,
allowing policies to inspect and enforce conditions across typed data contents, beyond just the domain and primary type.
Syntax:
- Nested struct fields:
eth.eip_712.message['outerField']['innerField'] - Array element fields:
eth.eip_712.message['arrayField'][0]['innerField'] - Array iteration:
eth.eip_712.message['arrayField'].all(item, <condition>) - Array length:
eth.eip_712.message['arrayField'].count()
PermitBatchTransferFrom type lets users sign a single message authorizing
multiple token transfers. The message contains a permitted array of TokenPermissions structs,
each with a token address and an amount.
Array elements can be accessed by index (
[0], [1], etc.). The condition message['permitted'][0]['token'] == '0xA0b8...'
checks the first entry. You can also check specific positions explicitly
(for example, message['permitted'][0]['token'] == '0xA0b8...' && message['permitted'][1]['token'] == '0xA0b8...').
Use .all() when you want to apply the same token check across the entire permitted array. A .all() example is included below.Iterating over array fields
Whitelist a specific token across all approvals with .all():in works for integer fields. For string fields such as token addresses, use || instead.Deny signing of NO_OP keccak256 payloads
Allow signing of EIP-712 payloads for EIP-3009 transfers
Allow signing of EIP-712 payloads for EIP-2612 permits for USD Coin
Allow signing of EIP-7702 authorizations
Allow only the delegate contracts that you trust, on your specific chains:- Write each address in the EIP-55 checksummed (mixed-case) form, because the comparison is case-sensitive.
- Write
chain_idandnonceas numbers (without quotes). Turnkey rejects a policy that compares a number to a quoted value. - To also allow
ACTIVITY_TYPE_SIGN_RAW_PAYLOAD, useactivity.type in ['ACTIVITY_TYPE_SIGN_RAW_PAYLOAD', 'ACTIVITY_TYPE_SIGN_RAW_PAYLOAD_V2']. - For the activities that populate
eth.eip_7702_authorization, see EIP-7702.
Deny signing of EIP-7702 authorizations for all chains
An authorization withchain_id 0 is valid on all EVM chains. To deny these authorizations in the
activities that populate eth.eip_7702_authorization, you can use a policy like the following:
Deny batch signing of EIP-7702 authorizations
ACTIVITY_TYPE_SIGN_RAW_PAYLOADS does not populate eth.eip_7702_authorization. To deny EIP-7702
authorizations in this activity, use the encoding. This policy blocks only
PAYLOAD_ENCODING_EIP7702_AUTHORIZATION. A hexadecimal or UTF-8 payload can also be an
authorization, so if a key must not sign authorizations, allow raw payload signing only with
PAYLOAD_ENCODING_EIP712 (see EIP-7702).
Deny signing of Type 4 transactions
The policy engine does not expose the authorization list of a Type 4 (EIP-7702) transaction. To block Type 4 transactions, deny them by type. This policy covers the transactions that you sign withACTIVITY_TYPE_SIGN_TRANSACTION and ACTIVITY_TYPE_SIGN_TRANSACTION_V2.
ACTIVITY_TYPE_ETH_SEND_TRANSACTION_V2 and ACTIVITY_TYPE_ETH_UNDELEGATE_7702 have a different eth.tx.type, so this policy does not apply to them.